BYU Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 2

Article 7

Spring 3-10-2021

The Role of Courts in the Evolution of Standard Form Contracts:
An Insurance Case Study
Daniel Schwarcz

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel Schwarcz, The Role of Courts in the Evolution of Standard Form Contracts: An Insurance Case
Study, 46 BYU L. Rev. 471 (2021).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol46/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

3.SCHWARCZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

3/11/2021 12:58 AM

The Role of Courts in the Evolution of
Standard Form Contracts:
An Insurance Case Study
Daniel Schwarcz*
Standard form contracts are a pervasive feature of modern
commercial life—for ordinary consumers and big businesses alike.
Yet remarkably little is currently known about how and when
these contracts evolve in response to judicial decisions that
interpret and apply them in individual disputes. Homeowners
insurance policies offer a particularly fertile ground for studying
this issue due to both the prominence of the insurance law doctrine
that ambiguities are interpreted against the drafter and the
historic standardization of insurance policies across different
insurers. Utilizing a unique hand-collected dataset, this Article
empirically investigates the links between innovation in the
dominant “ISO HO3” homeowners policy and published caselaw
interpreting that contract. The results demonstrate that judicial
caselaw has indeed played a vital role in the evolution of
homeowners insurance policies over the last fifty years, forcing
insurers to spell out their obligations more precisely and clearly.
Notably, judicially prompted changes to policy language have
often expanded coverage, suggesting that judicial scrutiny can
empower regulators and market intermediaries to secure drafting
concessions in revisions to homeowners policies. Normatively,
these results provide strong support for insurance law’s central
doctrine that ambiguities are interpreted against the drafter.
When considered in light of prior research demonstrating that
some homeowners insurers have recently begun departing from
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the ISO HO3 policy in ways that systematically restrict coverage,
this Article’s results also suggest that states should strongly
consider requiring homeowners policies to provide coverage that
is no less generous than the ISO HO3 policy. With respect to
contract law more generally, the Article’s findings suggest that
contractual innovation, particularly when prompted by caselaw,
operates quite differently in different market and
regulatory settings.
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Role of Courts in the Evolution of Standard Form Contracts

INTRODUCTION
Standard form contracts are a pervasive feature of modern
commercial life—for ordinary consumers and big businesses alike.1
Yet remarkably little is currently known about how and when
standard form contracts evolve in response to cases that interpret
and apply them in individual disputes.2 To date, this relationship
between caselaw and the evolution of standard form contracts has
principally been studied in two narrow domains: sovereign bond
contracts3 and end user license agreements (EULAs).4 With respect
to a number of key issues—such as how and when contract terms
change in response to judicial pressures—these studies have
yielded contrasting results.5 Just as importantly, these studies have
left unanswered a range of key issues regarding the role of courts
in prompting contractual innovation, such as the extent to which
judicially triggered revisions to standard form contracts
systematically favor drafters or contract adherents.
This Article aims to make progress in answering these pivotal
questions for contract law by examining the issue in a new setting:
insurance. Insurance contracts offer a particularly fertile ground
for studying the interplay between contractual innovation and

1. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1226 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 546 (1971); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE:
THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–53, 123–42 (2013).
2. Some studies have found that even terms that courts have found unenforceable
are nonetheless included in many consumer contracts. See Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the
Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2017); Meirav Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable
Contract Terms: Experimental Evidence, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1031, 1035 (2019).
3. See also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 725 (1997)
(examining contractual innovation in the context of bond covenants). See generally Stephen J.
Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of
Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004) (studying innovation in sovereign bonds); Stephen
J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2013) (same).
4. See generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240 (2013) (studying
changes to end user license agreements over time); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Learning in Standard Form Contracts: Theory and Evidence (N.Y.U. Ctr. for L.,
Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 18-11, 2018) (same).
5. See infra Part I.
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caselaw, for two central reasons.6 First, insurance policies have
traditionally been drafted by a private entity known as the
Insurance Services Office (ISO), resulting in the rough
standardization of insurance policies across different insurance
companies.7 Although some insurers have recently begun utilizing
their own proprietary policies, most insurers continue to rely on
forms that hew closely to the ISO model.8 Second, the central
doctrine of insurance law—that ambiguities are interpreted against
the drafter—potentially creates strong incentives for insurers to
re-draft their policy terms in response to caselaw.9
In studying how and when insurance policies evolve in
response to judicial pressures, this Article focuses on one of the
most important types of ISO policies: the HO3 homeowners
insurance policy. This homeowners policy provides “open peril”
property insurance against risk to an insured’s home, “named
peril” coverage of the insured’s personal property, and liability
insurance against suits alleging certain types of bodily injury or
6. To be sure, like any contractual setting, insurance contracts also raise their own
unique complications. Perhaps most importantly, state insurance regulation constrains the
terms of homeowners insurance policies in various significant ways. See generally KENNETH
S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 150–54 (7th ed. 2020).
Policy form regulation typically occurs through a prior approval process, whereby insurers
and ISO file proposed base policies and endorsements with the insurance department, which
must approve them before they may be used. Robert L. Tucker, Disappearing Ink: The
Emerging Duty to Remove Invalid Policy Provisions, 42 AKRON L. REV. 519, 577 (2009). During
this review process, state regulators ostensibly review the forms to determine whether they
are “unfair,” “ambiguous,” “unreasonable,” “contrary to public policy,” or some
combination of these broad standards. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-9 (LexisNexis 2014);
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-10 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7513 (2010). The actual extent of this
type of review varies significantly by state and type of filing. For instance, ISO submissions
get substantially more attention because of how many carriers use all or some of ISO Forms.
Additionally, regulators review filed policy forms to ensure that they comply with various
state-specific rules. This type of “check-the-box” regulatory review is more commonly
enforced, though even here state insurance regulation is quite uneven. Section IV.A, infra,
discusses how rate regulatory review and ISO’s participation in this process impacts the
implications of the Paper’s findings. As is relevant here, regulatory form review presumably
slows innovation by creating extra costs for such innovation (i.e. the costs of negotiating with
regulators) for approval.
7. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
1263, 1270–72 (2011) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Reevaluating].
8. See id. at 1314 (finding that “five carriers among the sixteen studied employ
policies that are substantially less generous than the [ISO] HO3 policy” and that all five are
national in scope and rely on captive agent distribution systems).
9. See Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
305, 305 (2013) [hereinafter Boardman, Penalty Default Rules].
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property damage.10 The majority of American homeowners pay
hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars a year for the promises
contained in homeowners insurance policies that are nearly or
completely identical to the ISO HO3 policy.11
The Article’s empirical analysis of this industry standard
homeowners policy proceeds in two phases. The first, and more
straightforward, component of the analysis systematically tracks
the evolution of each of the hundreds of terms within the ISO HO3
policy since its inception approximately fifty years ago.12 During
that time, the ISO HO3 policy has undergone major revisions five
times: in 1975, 1984, 1990, 1999, and 2010.13 To track the evolution
of these policies, I break up each of these five versions of the ISO
HO3 policy into hundreds of discrete terms.14 I then compare each
term of each policy version to the corresponding term in the prior
version, tracking every term that was changed in a policy revision
and whether that change restricted coverage, expanded coverage,
or had mixed results regarding the scope of coverage. This analysis
demonstrates that the length and complexity of the standard form
homeowners policy has increased substantially over time, but at a
gradually decreasing rate.15 It also reveals that changes in standard
policy language have expanded and restricted coverage in roughly
equal measure.
These findings set the stage for the Article’s empirical heart,
which links changes in insurance policy provisions to caselaw that
may plausibly have triggered those changes. To do so, I—along
with a team of research assistants—first isolated each individual
policy term that was materially altered in one of the five revisions
to the ISO homeowners policy.16 For each of these material
alterations, we then located all cases on Westlaw that quoted key
words from the term that was revised and that had been published

10. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 196.
11. See Facts + Statistics: Homeowners and Renters Insurance, INS. INFO. INST.,
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-homeowners-and-renters-insurance (last
visited Nov. 29, 2020).
12. See infra Section II.B.
13. See text accompanying infra notes 121–27.
14. See infra Section II.B.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
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between the date of the revision and the date of the prior revision.17
We then individually examined each of these cases and eliminated
any cases where the published opinion suggested that the parties
did not contest the meaning of the term. Having eliminated the
false positives, we then recorded a variety of the remaining cases’
features, including the type of court that issued the opinion and the
prevailing party. To provide a control measure against which to
compare these results, we repeated this process for a random subset
of policy terms that were not revised in the relevant ISO
homeowners policy revision. As detailed below, the resulting data
support a range of inferences regarding when and how caselaw
interpreting insurance policy language prompts revisions to
that language.18
To be sure, this methodology has limitations. First, it focuses
solely on correlations between changes in policy language and
insurance coverage litigation, and it therefore cannot definitively
establish causation. Although a causal link between published
caselaw regarding a term’s meaning and that term’s subsequent
revision is the most natural explanation for the findings, other
explanations for this correlation are also plausible. For instance, it
is possible that the very reason that a term is frequently litigated is
because it is flawed in ways that would inevitably have prompted
contractual change.19 Second, this approach focuses solely on
identifying whether changes to policy language were potentially
linked to caselaw, rather than the related question of whether
policy terms were left unchanged notwithstanding relevant
caselaw. Others have demonstrated that at least some insurance
policy terms are indeed heavily litigated but nonetheless remain
unchanged in insurers’ policies.20
17. We include buffer periods of two years on either end to account for potential time
lags. See infra Part III.
18. For further methodological detail, see infra Section II.B.
19. See infra Section II.B.
20. In particular, Michelle Boardman and Christopher French have both written about
the evolution of insurance policies over time, focusing on instances when insurers retain
policy language that courts have criticized or that has effectively lost its meaning.
See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1105, 1113–14, 1117 (2006) [hereinafter Boardman, Contra Proferentem] (arguing that
insurers often choose not to redraft terms that courts have found ambiguous because they
value the certainty produced by these rulings more than the costs associated with providing
expanded coverage, particularly because they can pass these costs on to policyholders);
Michelle E. Boardman, The Unpredictability of Insurance Interpretation, 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
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With these caveats in mind, the data suggest that judicial
caselaw has indeed played a vital role in prompting material
changes to the standard form homeowners policy throughout its
approximately fifty-year evolution.21 Over this time, materially
altered terms were linked to approximately twice as many cases
interpreting their meaning as compared to unchanged terms.22
These differences are statistically significant at a 99% confidence
level when aggregated across all policy revision years.23
The data also reveal a number of additional notable trends.
First, caselaw appears to play an increasingly important role in
prompting material changes to the homeowners policy; both the
average number of cases linked to material modifications (relative
to unchanged terms) and the overall percentage of material
modifications that are linked to caselaw (also relative to unchanged
terms) increased over time.24 Second, coverage-expanding
modifications to policy language were no more likely to be linked
to caselaw than the control group of unchanged terms.25 By
contrast, both coverage-restricting modifications and modifications
PROBS. 27, 29 (2019) (arguing that courts do not always appreciate that an insurance policy
term found to be ambiguous may not be redrafted, may be impossible to redraft effectively,
or may be redrafted in a way that harms consumers); Christopher C. French, Insurance
Policies: The Grandparents of Contractual Black Holes, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 40, 42–43 (2017)
[hereinafter French, Insurance Policies] (arguing that four specific insurance policy terms—(1)
“Sue and Labor” Clauses, (2) “Ensuing Loss” Clauses, (3) “Non-Cumulation” Clauses, and
(4) the “Sudden and Accidental” Pollution Exclusion—constitute “contractual black holes”
because they are used repeatedly in insurance policies notwithstanding the fact that they
have lost any discernable meaning); Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies
as Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial
Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 547–48 (2017); Christopher C. French, The Butterfly Effect in
Interpreting Insurance Policies, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47–49 (2019) (discussing various
ways in which judicial interpretations of insurance policies can have ripple effects, including
by prompting redrafting that may trigger new disputes); see also Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati
& Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 n.16 (2017)
(speculating that insurance policies may in some cases contain contractual blackholes).
See generally John F. Coyle, The Butterfly Effect in Boilerplate Contract Interpretation, 82 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. i (2019) (exploring the various ways in which judicial interpretations of
contracts can have unexpected ripple effects, which may include prompting redrafting).
21. See infra Part III.
22. Depending on the revision year, each term that is materially changed is linked to
an average of between 1.8 to 4.5 cases that are likely to have played a role in prompting the
revision. By contrast, the average number of cases linked to unchanged terms ranged from
.93 to 1.88 depending on the year.
23. See infra Section III.B.
24. See infra Section III.B.
25. See infra Section III.B.
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with mixed effects on the scope of coverage were, on average,
linked to more cases than the control group.26 Third, policyholders
need not prevail in the majority of coverage disputes for
those disputes to be linked to changed policy language.27
However, policyholder success in at least one case during the
relevant time period appears to be an important contributor to
contractual change.28
Collectively, these results suggest that courts play a pivotal role
in forcing insurers to spell out their contractual relationship with
policyholders more precisely.29 This revision process is apparently
impacted by regulators, market intermediaries, or reputational
concerns, as ISO regularly incorporates compromise terms into
updated versions of their policies.30 Ultimately, then, the “penalty
default” approach of insurance law—which penalizes drafters for
ambiguities either by interpreting them in favor of coverage or by
adopting a relatively policyholder-friendly default rule—seems to
produce important and sensible long-term results in shaping
ordinary consumers’ insurance coverage, at least for the majority of
insurers that hew closely to the ISO HO3 form.
The Article’s findings have additional normative implications
when considered in light of earlier research showing that
homeowners policy forms that depart significantly from the ISO
HO3 policy often systematically restrict coverage.31 In particular,
the comparatively even-handed evolution of the ISO HO3 policy
suggests that states should require homeowners policies to provide
coverage that is no less generous than that contained within this

26. See infra Section III.B.
27. See infra Section III.B.
28. See infra Section III.B.
29. On penalty default rules in general, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97–100 (1989).
On the use of penalty default rules in insurance, see Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of
Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 545 (1997); Boardman, Penalty Default
Rules, supra note 9; Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, Mandatory Rules and Default Rules in Insurance
Contracts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 377, 379–83
(Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015).
30. See Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457,
1471–76 (2017) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Coverage Information] (providing several examples
when insurers redrafted policy provisions in response to judicial determinations that a policy
was ambiguous).
31. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7.
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presumptive industry default policy.32 Adopting this approach
would parallel states’ creation of a mandatory fire insurance policy
in response to individual fire insurers hollowing out coverage from
their policy more than a century ago.33 It would do so, however, by
piggybacking on the evolution of the ISO HO3 policy in response
to decades of caselaw and resulting revisions.
Outside of the insurance domain, this Article’s findings support
emerging research in the empirical contracts literature suggesting
that the evolution of standard form contracts varies significantly
across different contractual settings.34 The Article’s findings also
suggest that the impact to consumers of contractual innovation
generally, and judicially prompted innovation in particular, may
depend on various market-specific factors, including the
prominence of industry-wide standardized forms and the extent to
which regulators and market actors can directly or indirectly
influence the contract revision process.35
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief
overview of the literature on the evolution of standard form
contracts. Part II turns to the specific context of homeowners
insurance policies, providing key background and laying out in
detail the Article’s methodology for studying the role of caselaw in
shaping the evolution of this vitally important consumer contract.
The results of the empirical inquiry are presented in Part III. Finally,
Part IV discusses the implications of these results both for insurance
law specifically and for contract law more generally.

32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Section IV.A.2.
34. For instance, consumer-oriented standard form contracts like homeowners
insurance policies and end user license agreements for software products may be relatively
more likely to evolve in response to judicial pressures than sophisticated financial contracts.
See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, at 240; Dari-Mattiacci & Marotta-Wurgler,
supra note 4, at 4–5.
35. See John Coyle, A Short History of the Choice-of-Law Clause, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 1147,
1209 (2020) (“[T]he process of contractual change can vary depending upon a range of
variables—including, but not limited to, the nature of the contract provision at issue, the type
of agreement, the identity of the drafter, the geographic location where the contract is
prepared, and the centralized or decentralized nature of the drafting community—and that
a great deal depends upon context.”).
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I. INNOVATION IN STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS
In recent years, legal scholars have increasingly recognized the
importance of understanding the processes by which contracts are
drafted and redrafted over time. The resulting literature has found
that certain sophisticated financial contracts are often resistant to
change, even in the face of clearly relevant caselaw.36 At the same
time, there is evidence that some types of contract terms—
particularly consumer-oriented contracts, like end user license
agreements—can evolve relatively quickly in the face of relevant
market, technological, or interpretive shocks. This Part briefly
summarizes this literature, dividing the field between studies of
sophisticated financial contracts and investigations of consumeroriented standard form contracts.
A. Innovation in Sophisticated Commercial Contracts
Legal scholars have devoted extensive attention to
understanding the processes by which sophisticated commercial
contracts like bond covenants evolve over time. This literature
suggests that many of these contracts are resistant to change, even
in the wake of important and clearly relevant legal, market, or
technological developments.37 When sophisticated financial
36. See infra note 37.
37. Contractual stickiness has perhaps been most clearly demonstrated in the context
of sovereign bond contracts. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in
Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation?, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 17 (2018)
(exploring reasons for the stickiness of the pari passu clause in sovereign bond contracts);
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practice, 80 TUL.
L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2006); Choi & Gulati, supra note 3, at 945 (finding that it took
approximately three years for New York issuances of sovereign bond contracts to adopt
revised “unanimous action clauses” after Ecuador restructured its debt without achieving
unanimous consent by creatively interpreting its contracts’ terms but that countries
thereafter quickly herded towards new language); Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 3, at 1–
6. A number of studies have also examined these issues in the context of commercial bond
contracts. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 3, at 713. For instance, pari passu clauses were
routinely included in sovereign bond contracts even though market participants held widely
diverging views on the term’s meaning and holdout creditors had successfully invoked the
clause to insist on preferential payouts in numerous sovereign debt restructurings. Even after
a highly prominent case finally resolved the actual meaning of pari passu clauses in a case
that many suggest upended the markets’ understanding of this clause, it took years for
sovereign bond contracts to adjust their terms in response. See Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati &
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, If Boilerplate Could Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond
Contracts, 44 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 617, 621–23 (2019); see also John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green,
Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133, 133 (2014) (examining
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contracts do eventually respond to legal or market developments,
they often do so quickly and dramatically, as parties herd towards
new standard terms.38
There are numerous potential reasons that terms in financial
contracts may be sticky, even in the wake of relevant judicial
decisions impacting their meaning or implications.39 Perhaps the
most frequently emphasized explanation is that standardized
contract terms may result in positive network externalities.40 Under
this theory, firms’ use of a particular contract term is more valuable
to the extent that other firms have used that term in the past and
continue to use that term in the future.41 Another explanation for
contractual stickiness is that innovating firms generally cannot
prevent rivals from free-riding on their drafting efforts, which
reduces firms’ incentives to invest in revising contract language.42

innovations in the contracts governing venture capital financing of Silicon Valley companies
in the wake of technological shifts); Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract
Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71 (2018) (examining innovation M&A contracts and showing how
this innovation often occurs through collaboration rather than through the use of structured
modules); Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements,
85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 61 (2017) (arguing that innovation in merger agreements is highly
path-dependent, resulting in “systematic inefficiencies in the acquisition agreement drafting
process which raises costs and risk to clients”); Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete
Contracts (Feb. 24, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3446206.
38. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 3, at 933 (describing herding of parties to revised
unanimous action clauses after issuance of Mexican bonds in 2003); see also Kahan &
Klausner, supra note 3, at 713 (showing herding in event risk covenants, which protect
bondholders from events like leveraged buyouts that could dilute their value). In some cases,
sophisticated commercial parties herd around contractual language that is not suboptimal
so much as meaningless. Such contractual black holes can occur when contracting parties
routinely incorporate standardized boilerplate into their contracts that has not been litigated
or otherwise subject to dispute. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 20, at 8–15.
39. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses?
The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 977–83 (2014)
(describing eleven different reasons why contracts may be sticky).
40. See id. (noting this is dominant theory/explanation for contract stickiness).
41. For instance, maintaining the same boilerplate as many other firms means that this
language is likely to have a clear and predictable meaning in the marketplace and among
courts. It also may reduce the costs of hiring future professional service providers who will
be familiar with these terms and how they interact with other terms or issues. See Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 786–89
(1995); see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996).
42. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 286 (1985);

481

3.SCHWARCZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/11/2021 12:58 AM

46:2 (2021)

Other potential impediments to contractual innovation include the
risk that redrafting may send a negative signal to third parties,43
may result in agency costs for potential innovators like lawyers,44
or may complicate the ability of markets to price and invest in the
associated instruments.45
Despite these impediments, the terms of sophisticated
commercial contracts do of course change at times in response to
market, technological, or judicial shocks.46 Market intermediaries
often play a significant role in this evolution. Intermediaries like
securities underwriters and trade organizations can overcome
some of the collective action problems that ordinarily inhibit
contractual evolution.47 For instance, they can communicate the
perspectives of parties impacted by contract terms and pool the
resources of competing firms to draft model contract terms.48 These
terms can then potentially be quickly and widely adopted by
numerous firms at once, thus overcoming network effects.49
B. Innovation in Mass-Market Standard Form Consumer Contracts
Consumer-oriented standard form contracts are, of course,
drafted and agreed to in a much different set of circumstances than
Avery Wiener Katz, Standard Form Contracts, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 502, 503 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
43. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 655–60 (2006); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 608 (1998).
44. See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
59, 60 (2001).
45. See Gus De Franco, Florin P. Vasvari, Dushyantkumar Vyas & Regina WittenbergMoerman, Similarity in the Restrictiveness of Bond Covenants, 29 EUR. ACCT. REV. 665, 665 (2020)
(finding that “bonds with more similar covenant restrictiveness receive lower yields at
issuance” and “are characterized by greater liquidity in the secondary market”).
46. See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years
of Deals (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 889, 2016;
Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 333/2016, 2016).
47. Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1075, 1086 (2006). For instance, both the adoption and the abandonment of event risk
covenants was driven by underwriters. By contrast, in sovereign debt contracts, the eventual
market shift away from collective action clauses was driven by attorneys—particularly those
working for issuers. See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, at 247. In-house counsel, in
particular, may be more willing to push innovation than outside law firms because they
experience more of the upside of such innovation.
48. See Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 97 (2013).
49. See id.
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sophisticated financial contracts. For this reason, it is hardly
surprising that empirical research suggests that drafting parties
select different types of terms in these two settings.50 Yet compared
to the literature examining innovation of sophisticated financing
contracts, remarkably few studies examine contract innovation in
mass-market standard form contracts. However, the studies of
consumer-oriented standard form contracts that do exist
suggest that these contracts may not always be as sticky as their
commercial counterparts.
The leading empirical studies of contractual innovation in the
consumer context focus on mass-market end user license
agreements (EULAs) for software products.51 In this setting,
individual firms have often amended their contracts in response to
a variety of considerations, including litigation outcomes.52 Firms
appear to be more likely to revise EULA terms when they learn new
information about the impact of those terms through customer and
employee feedback or court decisions.53 On average, changes to
EULA terms tend to be pro-seller and to result in longer contracts.54
50. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory
Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and
Non-consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 118, 118 (2008) (finding that firms are more likely to
include mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer-oriented contracts than in their
contracts with other large firms).
51. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, at 240; Dari-Mattiacci & Marotta-Wurgler,
supra note 4.
52. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, analyzed changes in the EULAs of 247
different companies in 2003 and 2010, focusing on 32 specific terms. They found that
approximately 40% of firms materially changed at least one core term in these agreements,
with some firms materially revising more than ten of the identified terms. In general, larger
and growing firms were more likely to change their contracts during the study period. The
study also found that one important driver of firms’ contract changes was published caselaw
relevant to the enforceability of the underlying term. To reach this conclusion, it first
attempted to measure the likelihood that a given term would be enforced by measuring the
ratio of the cases enforcing a term to the total number of times that its enforceability was
disputed in the caselaw. Acknowledging the limits of this approach, the article also focused
on the impact of a single landmark case finding that one particular type of term in the study
was enforceable. Under either approach, the analysis concluded that firms were more likely
to adopt terms when those terms were more likely to be enforced by courts, and more likely
to drop terms that courts were less willing to enforce. See id.
53. See Dari-Mattiacci & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 4, at 4–5 (finding that sellers are
more likely to revise EULA terms that offer an opportunity to learn).
54. See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 4, at 244. The extent of the pro-seller bias
increased if terms that merely informed consumers of their rights without substantively
altering those rights were excluded from the calculus. However, the spread in the pro-seller
bias of contracts increased over the study’s time period, indicating decreased

483

3.SCHWARCZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/11/2021 12:58 AM

46:2 (2021)

Outside of the EULA studies, there is mixed evidence regarding
the extent to which mass-market standard form contracts are sticky.
For instance, in the wake of several high-profile Supreme Court
cases limiting state efforts to restrict pre-dispute arbitration clauses
and class action waivers,55 many commentators speculated that
firms would dramatically increase their usage of these terms.56
However, a study of franchise agreements found that only a small
number of firms amended their contracts to include these terms.57
As a theoretical matter, there are various reasons to suspect that
certain types of mass-market consumer contracts may be relatively
less sticky than sophisticated commercial contracts. For instance,
firms may have more opportunities to learn about the impact of
terms in consumer-oriented contracts, which are used in so many
more transactions than sophisticated financial contracts.58
Alternatively, firms may be better able to coordinate changes to
standardized consumer contracts because these contracts can
standardization of terms over time as some subset of firms revised their contracts to become
more consumer friendly. Id. at 261. Meanwhile, younger firms, growing firms, and firms with
in-house counsel were more likely to change their contracts in a pro-seller direction. Id.
55. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts state court decisions invalidating class arbitration waivers
as unconscionable); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (holding that
arbitral class action waivers were enforceable notwithstanding the possibility that such
waivers might make it economically infeasible to secure relief).
56. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation
in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629 (2012);
Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice,
90 OR. L. REV. 703, 718 (2012).
57. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 39, at 955–56. The study focused on two
samples of franchise agreements to determine whether arbitration clauses or class action
waivers became more common in franchise agreements in the two years after Concepcion was
published in 2011. It found that only a small number of firms changed their contracts to
include arbitration clauses, with the percentage of such firms increasing between 1% and 5%,
depending on the sample. Among the firms that did use arbitration clauses, there was a
larger percentage increase in firms that also included a class action waiver (from 78% to 87%).
See id. at 990–91. As the authors suggest, one plausible reason for the lack of a shift to class
action waivers is that firms preferred this outcome given the low risk of class action lawsuits
and the possibility that franchisors valued the option of being able to litigate disputes with
franchisees. Id. at 986. Moreover, in a supplemental analysis to evaluate the possibility of
stickiness as an explanation for their findings, the authors report that approximately 80% of
firms changed at least one of their contract terms in either 2011 or 2012 and approximately
10% of firms changed at least 10 of their terms in at least one of the two years. See id. at 1004.
58. See Dari-Mattiacci & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 4. See generally David A.
Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (2018) (exploring how firms
may change their contracts after interacting with consumers).
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frequently be changed unilaterally, with minimal costs or
opposition from consumers.59
II. INVESTIGATING INNOVATION OF HOMEOWNERS
INSURANCE POLICIES
Each year, millions of consumers purchase homeowners
insurance policies to protect their homes, possessions, and wealth.
These contracts constitute the sole consideration that consumers
receive in exchange for their upfront payment of hundreds or
thousands of dollars in premiums.60 Homeowners insurance
policies are consequentially of vital importance to domestic
commerce. But as Section A of this Part makes clear, homeowners
policies are also drafted and revised within an institutional and
legal context that makes them a particularly interesting subject for
studying contractual innovation. In particular, many insurers use
contracts that largely or completely replicate an industry-wide
standard form, and the dominant mode of insurance policy
interpretation is specifically designed to prompt clarification of
what is covered by these contracts. With this context in mind,
Section B develops a two-phase methodology for studying the role
of courts in the innovation of the presumptive industry standard
homeowners policy. Phase One consists of systematically tracking
the development of the hundreds of terms and conditions within
the ISO homeowners policy across each of its five major revisions
over the last roughly fifty years. Phase Two then attempts to link
changes to these terms to relevant caselaw regarding the meaning
of the changed term.
A. Key Factors Potentially Impacting Innovation of
Homeowners Policies
Like all contracts, homeowners insurance policies are drafted
and revised within a distinct institutional and legal context. Two
elements of this context are particularly noteworthy in
understanding the process by which the homeowners policy has
59. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments,
57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 648–53 (2010) (exploring ways in which companies can unilaterally
amend the terms of consumer-oriented contracts in ways that consumers rationally ignore).
60. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1404 (2007).
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evolved over the last half-century.61 First, until recently, virtually
all insurers selling homeowners coverage in the United States used
a policy form that nearly or completely replicated the Insurance
Services Office’s (ISO) model HO3 form.62 Second, the dominant
interpretive rule of insurance law—that ambiguities are interpreted
against the drafter—is specifically designed to prompt insurers to
clarify ambiguous policy language.63 Taken together, these two
factors suggest that insurance policies may be less sticky than other
types of standard form contracts.
1. The evolution of the ISO HO3 policy
The standardization of the homeowners policy dates back to the
mid-twentieth century.64 Until the 1950s, insurers typically sold
packages of property insurance forms to insureds, each of which
covered individual perils, like fire, wind, and burglary.65 Although
some insurers experimented with selling multi-line policies in the
1930s and ’40s, these efforts were variable and generally did not

61. Also noteworthy is the fact that insurance policies are subject to an unusual, if not
unique, state regulatory regime. See supra note 6.
62. See Thomas L. Wenck, The Historical Development of Standard Policies, 35 J. RISK &
INS. 537, 541 (1968); Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense,
95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) [hereinafter Boardman, Tested Language Defense] (describing
the “hyperstandardization” of insurance policies); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in
Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2008) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance
companies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, 1 LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.06[b], at 4-37 (2d ed. Supp. 2005);
Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 543
(1996); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945:
Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 18 (1993); James M.
Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus
Context, 24 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the standard policy that is
generally customized to the consumer-insured is the Declaration Sheet . . . . [T]here is little,
if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language of the insurance contract that
determines the scope of coverage.”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV.
1113, 1153 (1990) (“But automobile and property owner’s liability insurance contracts
are standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to
bargain around.”).
63. See, e.g., Boardman, Penalty Default Rules, supra note 9, at 305.
64. See generally INS. SERVS. OFF., HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: THREATS FROM WITHOUT,
THREATS FROM WITHIN (1996) [hereinafter ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT]; Eugene L.
Lecomte, History of the Property Insurance Policy, 40 CHARTERED PROP. & CAS. UNDERWRITERS
J. 226 (1987).
65. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64.
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include liability insurance.66 By the 1950s, however, insurers
increasingly realized that consumers were attracted to multi-line,
bundled policies that offered protection from a range of risks
associated with home ownership.67
Individual insurers’ efforts to offer such bundled coverage
faced two key hurdles, however. First, insurers’ experimentation
with bundled homeowners policies often confused consumers,
state regulators, and insurance agents.68 This experimentation also
prompted concern that the fine print within complicated policy
forms would not match the coverage that insurers were
marketing.69 Indeed, competing insurers’ hollowing out of
coverage within their policies’ fine print had prompted many states
to require decades earlier that fire insurance policies conform to
prescribed models detailed in statute or regulation.70 Second,
individual insurers that experimented with unique bundled
homeowners policies faced difficulties in accurately predicting
future losses.71 Insurers had long relied on aggregate loss data to
help predict losses: such data were much more robust than any
individual insurer’s loss data, and hence much more reliable.72 But
such industry-wide data became less reliable as insurers combined
historically distinct coverages, especially as they altered these
coverages to nest together.73
To address these problems, insurers formed the national
Multi-Line Insurance Rating Bureau (MLIRB) in 1964.74 The
primary goal of this organization was to develop and maintain
standardized multi-peril forms.75 The insurer-developed rating
agency thereafter published a series of multi-line peril policies for
66. See id.
67. See id. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rediscovering the Sawyer Solution: Bundling
Risk for Protection and Profit, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 170 (2013).
68. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64.
69. See id.
70. See George W. Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy,
37 COLUM. L. REV. 410, 410 (1937).
71. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6.
72. See Daniel Schwarcz, Ending Public Utility Style Rate Regulation in Insurance,
35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 941 (2018).
73. See id.
74. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64, at 49. See generally Curtis M.
Elliott, The Best Insurance for Your Home and Belongings, CHANGING TIMES: KIPLINGER MAG.,
July 1966, at 17, 17–20.
75. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64.
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homeowners, which it labeled HO1, HO2, HO3, etc.76 The rating
agency continually tweaked these policies through the late 1960s in
response to feedback from a variety of groups. Nonetheless, these
versions of homeowners insurance policies were criticized by
stakeholders as excessively confusing and technical.77
In 1971, the insurance industry founded ISO as a national, nonprofit, unincorporated association of insurers to replace the prior
patchwork of rate-making bureaus, including the MLIRB.78 As one
of its first major initiatives, ISO created a task force to redraft the
MLIRB’s homeowners policies.79 In 1975 ISO completed these
revisions, which it unveiled a year later as part of the organization’s
larger 1976 Homeowners Program.80 The updated homeowners
policies were designed to simplify and streamline the MLIRB’s
homeowners policies and retained the designations of HO1, HO2,
HO3, etc.81 Throughout the early and mid-1980s, the ISO HO3
policy increasingly came to dominate the market for homeowners
coverage, with alternative forms in the program (like the HO1 and
HO2) fading in popularity.82 Subsequently, ISO published major
updates to the ISO HO3 policy form in 1984, 1990, 1999, and 2010.83
ISO’s internal process for updating insurance policy forms has
changed dramatically over the last fifty years. Prior to 1994, ISO
was controlled by its member insurers, which included
approximately 1,400 U.S. property and casualty insurers.84
76. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64. The original Homeowners
Program had just three options, which were the predecessors of the later HO1, HO2, and
HO5. By the mid- to late 1960s (if not earlier), the Homeowners Program had expanded to
five options, including the predecessor of HO3, which had to be taken together with option
4—a personal property coverage that could be bought separately by renters, for instance.
See MULTI-LINE INSURANCE RATING BUREAU, HOMEOWNERS POLICY PROGRAM (1970).
77. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64.
78. See D.C. DEP’T OF INS., SEC. & BANKING, REPORT OF EXAMINATION AS OF DECEMBER
31, 2011: EXAMINATION REPORT PREPARED BY INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS OF RISK AND
REGULATORY CONSULTING, LLC WITH REGARD TO THE MULTI-STATE MARKET CONDUCT
EXAMINATION OF ISO, 2–4 (2013) [hereinafter ISO EXAMINATION REPORT].
79. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64.
80. See id.; see also ROY C. MCCORMICK & WALLACE L. CLAPP, JR., HOMEOWNERS 76
POLICY PROGRAM GUIDE (1979).
81. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64.
82. See id.
83. ISO has routinely published various endorsements that can be combined with base
policies. In many cases, language from these endorsements has ultimately been incorporated
into the base form during one of the major revisions.
84. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993).
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Consistent with this structure, its policy revision process was
operated through committees of insurance representatives.85 On
occasion, ISO would release supplemental documents explaining
its rationales for specific policy revisions.86 In 1994, however,
insurer control of ISO was limited as part of a settlement of a longstanding federal antitrust lawsuit.87 ISO subsequently became an
independent for-profit corporation in 1997, which is now owned by
its parent company Verisk Analytics.88 Since that time, ISO has
carefully guarded information about its internal procedures for
updating insurance policy forms, providing only general
information about this process, such as statements that it considers
“input from insurers and producers.”89
Although homeowners insurers historically used the ISO HO3
form with minimal changes, some large modern insurers have
developed proprietary policies that depart in substantial ways from
this form.90 Many insurers—particularly smaller carriers—take the
standard ISO HO3 policy form, place their own logo on it, and may
even tweak the language occasionally.91 But all the important
coverage provisions and exclusions are the same.92 Increasingly,
however, a handful of national carriers substantially alter key terms
of the ISO HO3 policy in their own policy forms.93 In most cases,
but certainly not all, these changes systematically limit coverage.94

85. See id. at 773–76 (describing the process of competing insurers revising ISO’s
CGL policy).
86. See, e.g., David A. Gauntlett, Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Law and
Insurance, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 503, 521–22 (1995).
87. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 178.
88. See ISO EXAMINATION REPORT, supra note 78, at 3.
89. See ISO’s New Homeowners 2000 Insurance Program Overhauls Coverages to Reflect
Court Decisions and Lifestyle Changes, VERISK (May 17, 2000) [hereinafter VERISK,
Homeowners 2000], https://www.verisk.com/archived/2000/iso-s-new-homeowners-2000insurance-program-overhauls-coverages-to-reflect-court-decisions-and-lifes/.
90. See Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7, at 1308–17.
91. See id. at 1314.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 1280–308.
94. See id. at 1308–17.
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2. The penalty-default approach of insurance law
Courts routinely state that ordinary principles of contract law
guide the interpretation of insurance policy terms.95 Despite such
sweeping proclamations, insurance policy interpretation is
uniquely influenced by the contra proferentem canon, which is often
described as the “first principle of insurance law.”96 Under this rule,
ambiguities in insurance policy language are interpreted against
the drafter, who is virtually always the insurer.97 According to most
courts and commentators, the central rationale for contra
proferentem is that it holds the potential to induce insurers to draft
their insurance policies more clearly so as to avoid ambiguities.98
In other words, the rule is intended to operate as a “penalty
default rule.”99
Contra proferentem is not the sole penalty default rule of
insurance law. In fact, many, if not most, rules of insurance law can
appropriately be classified as penalty default rules.100 Starting with
the “default” nature of these rules, there is no doubt that most
insurance law doctrines can be altered by clear and relevant
language within the insurance policy.101 As for their status as
“penalties,” many default rules of insurance law—ranging from
those governing liability insurers’ duty to defend,102 concurrent

95. See, e.g., Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dimensions Assurance Ltd., 843 F.3d 133, 137
(4th Cir. 2016); Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 817 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 2016);
W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 814 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2016).
96. Abraham, supra note 62, at 531; see Fischer, supra note 62, at 996.
97. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE 14-101 to -02 (2019); RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 4 (AM. L. INST. 2019).
98. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653,
660 (2013); Baker & Logue, supra note 29, at 379–83; Boardman, Penalty Default Rules, supra
note 9, at 318; Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance
Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 207–08 (1995); see also
Neal-Pettit v. Lahman, 928 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ohio 2010) (“Allstate, as the drafter, is
responsible for ensuring that the policy states clearly what it does and does not cover.”).
99. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 29, at 91, 120 n.147.
100. Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1474.
101. See Baker & Logue, supra note 29, at 379–83; RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS.
§ 1 (AM. L. INST. 2019).
102. See Charles Silver, Basic Economics of the Defense of Covered Claims, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 438 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman
eds., 2015).
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causation,103 or subrogation104—are arguably designed to provide
relatively expansive coverage so as to prompt insurers that do not
intend for these results to redraft their contracts accordingly.105
Moreover, most of the penalty default rules of insurance law—
including both the general principle of contra proferentem and
various more specific insurance law doctrines—have particular
force when it comes to consumer-oriented insurance, like
homeowners insurance policies.106 For instance, some courts have
adopted a “sophisticated policyholder exception” to the contra
proferentem rule.107 Others have suggested that, when it comes to
insurance policies issued to ordinary consumers, contra proferentem
applies irrespective of extrinsic evidence suggesting that the
insurer maintained a relatively narrow understanding of
ambiguous policy language.108
There is no doubt that these penalty default rules of insurance
law have indeed caused insurers to redraft portions of their
homeowners insurance policies in response to unfavorable judicial
opinions.109 For instance, ISO and insurers redrafted the HO3
policy’s limited collapse exclusion multiple times in response to
unfavorable judicial opinions.110 Similarly, the anti-concurrent
causation language in the ISO HO3 policy has been redrafted on
103. Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic
Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957 (2010).
104. Alan O. Sykes, Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 383 (2001).
105. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1474.
106. Oxford Realty Grp. Cedar v. Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines Co., 160 A.3d 1263,
1271 (N.J. 2017) (“Similar to the doctrine of contra proferentem, the doctrine of reasonable
expectations is less applicable to commercial contracts.”).
107. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 728 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that while
Texas has never recognized a sophisticated insured exception to contra proferentem, it has
long recognized that this rule is “partially derivative of the unequal bargaining power typical
in many negotiations over insurance contracts,” which might justify such an exception).
See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 TORT TRIAL &
INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the “Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense
in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807 (1993).
108. See, e.g., Winter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 328 P.3d 665, 669 (Mont. 2014);
Bidwell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 367 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Ky. 2012); Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schmitz, 647 N.W.2d 223, 233–34 (Wis. 2002).
109. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64 (noting that changes in the
language of the ISO homeowners insurance policy have frequently been motivated by court
decisions producing results that were inconsistent with underwriters’ intent).
110. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1474; Rosen v. State Farm Gen.
Ins. Co., 70 P.3d 351, 363–64 (Cal. 2003) (discussing policy language governing collapse that
insurers specifically redrafted in response to prior adverse coverage determinations).
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several occasions in response to cases finding coverage when
insurers intended a different result.111 So too has the ISO HO3
exclusion for water damage.112 Other isolated examples of insurer
redrafting in apparent response to judicial decisions—both in the
homeowners insurance policy and in other types of insurance
policies—are not hard to locate. Moreover, ISO itself has noted on
multiple occasions that it considers court decisions when updating
insurance policy forms.113
On the other hand, there are also numerous examples of
insurers clinging to historic policy language that courts have
repeatedly found either to be ambiguous or subject to a
policyholder-friendly penalty default rule.114 Perhaps the most
well-known examples involve the relatively sparse language in the
liability section of the ISO HO3 policy (as well as many other
liability insurance policies) governing insurers’ duty to defend
cases alleging liability that may or may not ultimately result in
coverage.115 Other examples of language in the homeowners policy
that insurers have not redrafted in response to unfavorable court
decisions include clauses governing ensuing loss116 and actual cash
value recovery.117
Insurers’ failure to re-draft terms that courts have previously
found to be ambiguous or subject to policyholder-friendly default
rules can be explained by several considerations. First, the very
process of courts finding policy language to be ambiguous or
111. See 5 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 53.04[1][b][i] (2020)
(“Following judicial decisions that a homeowner’s policy covers a loss even where caused in
part by an excluded peril, many standard homeowner’s insurance policies were revised to
include anti-concurrent cause provisions.”).
112. See Charles M. Miller, ISO Changes Water Damage Exclusion in HO3: Is There
Now Coverage for Storm Surge Under the 2000 Version?, 1 WHITE PAPER,
https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/ISO%20CHANGES%20WATER%20DAMA
GE%20EXCLUSION%20IN%20HO3.pdf (last accessed Jan. 23, 2021).
113. See, e.g., VERISK, Homeowners 2000, supra note 89 (“‘We came up with the new
program after an extensive review of court rulings and lifestyle changes among an
expanding and aging population,’ said Michael Fusco, ISO’s executive vice president —
insurance services.”).
114. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14, 1117; French,
Insurance Policies, supra note 20, at 40.
115. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 615–16.
116. See id. at 266–67; see also Leep v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 261 F. Supp. 3d 1071,
1085 (D. Mont. 2017); Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1229,
1232–33 (N.D. Fla. 2012).
117. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 284–87.
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subject to a specific penalty default rule can result in that language
taking on a settled and predictable judicially constructed meaning,
which insurers can price in their subsequent policies.118 By contrast,
redrafting policy language in response to judicial opinions can be
risky due to the prospect that the redrafted policy language will
yield results in coverage disputes that insurers did not anticipate.
Second, redrafting policy language can be costly, both because
redrafted policy language generally must be approved by state
insurance regulators and because redrafting may result in courts
making negative inferences about prior versions of policy language
that may apply in ongoing disputes.119
B. Methodology for Assessing the Role of Courts in the Evolution of the
Homeowners Insurance Policy
Assessing the role of caselaw in prompting innovation in the
ISO HO3 homeowners policy requires two analytically distinct
steps. The first, and more straightforward, step is to systematically
track the evolution of this contract over time. The second, more
complex, step is to assess the extent to which caselaw is likely to
have played a significant role in prompting changes to terms when
they occurred.
1. Phase One: Tracking innovation in the ISO HO3 policy
The first step in the empirical analysis involves systematically
tracking the evolution of the ISO HO3 insurance policy, which has
operated as the presumptive industry-wide policy since the early
1980s.120 To do so, I first acquired from various libraries copies of
the five major ISO revisions to the HO3 base policy form,121

118. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14.
119. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 2.06[j], at 2-130
(Aspen 3d ed. 2006) (“Changing the standard form insurance policy is a somewhat arduous
process, requiring contributions from legal, claims, actuarial, and other industry personnel
as well as from customers and state insurance regulators.”).
120. See ISO, THREATS FROM WITHOUT, supra note 64.
121. I did not include any of the myriad endorsements to these policies that ISO
publishes. Some insurers will require that specific endorsements be included with their base
policies. In some cases, this reflects local risks, state-specific practices, or individual insurers’
preferences. In other cases, mandatory endorsements become widespread among insurers
nationally. When this occurs, the relevant provisions of the endorsements are sometimes
incorporated into the base ISO policy at the time of the next major revision.
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from 1975,122 1984,123 1990,124 1999,125 and 2010.126 I also secured a
copy of ISO’s 1971 HO3 policy, which was drafted and revised by
the organization’s predecessor, MLIRB, throughout the 1960s.127
Having acquired these six versions of the HO3 policy, I then
created a protocol for defining individual terms in each of these
documents. To do so, I followed prior research by relying on the
outline structure within the contracts themselves.128 In particular,
I treated all language that was contained within the third outline
level of each “Section” of the policies as individual terms.129 Thus,
for example, B.8.a and B.8.b in the Definitions section were separate
“terms.” However, where the policies broke down outline numbers
or letters to the fourth outline level or beyond, the separate sections
of the outline were treated as individual terms if, and only if, the
aggregate number of lines in that section of the policy was ten or
more. Thus, Sections B.1.a.1 and B.1.a.2 would be treated as
separate terms if Section B.1.a contained ten or more lines of text
in total.

122. HO3, ed. 12-75, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1975).
123. Homeowners 3: Special Form, ed. 4-84, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1984).
124. Homeowners 3: Special Form, HO 00 03 04 91, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1990).
125. Homeowners 3: Special Form, HO 00 03 10 00, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1999).
126. Homeowners 3: Special Form, HO 00 03 05 11, INS. SERVS. OFF. (2010).
127. HO3, ed. 9-71, INS. SERVS. OFF. (1971); see supra Section II.A. For the 1971 HO3
policy, I included two endorsements that were intended to supplement this policy: (i) the
standard New York fire insurance policy and (ii) an endorsement specifying the conditions
of coverage. See INS. INFO. INST., SAMPLE INSURANCE POLICIES FOR PROPERTY AND LIABILITY
COVERAGES: PREPARED FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS IN ADVANCED COURSES (1966).
128. See Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7.
129. The full protocol was as follows. First, each separate provision down to the third
outline level of the policy “Sections” was treated as an individual term. Outline levels were
generally apparent from the explicit outlining of the policy, such as B.8.a and B.8.b. In some
cases, however, the outline level was implicit from the structure of the policy’s headings.
Thus, the additional coverages on page 4 of the 1990 policy is the first outline level in the
section, even though it is not preceded by “D” or “IV.” Second, when the policy broke down
sections beyond the third outline level, those subdivisions were each treated as separate
terms if, and only if, the aggregate number of lines in that section (including the umbrella
terms) of the policy was ten or more. Third, an “umbrella section” that was either before or
after subdivided text was itself treated as a separate term if it contained 10 or more words.
Otherwise, this umbrella language was treated as part of the same term as the nearest outline
provision to which it applied.
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After subdividing the policies into individual “terms,” I130 then
assessed how each of these terms changed coverage relative to the
corresponding term in the previous version of the HO3 policy.131
I coded each term in each of the five ISO revisions to the HO3 policy
using the following scheme132:
Code
0
1
2
3
4
5

Description
No change in policy language.
Change to punctuation, formatting, or location of policy
text or to wording choice that does not plausibly alter
text’s meaning.
Change that may alter policy’s meaning and that restricts
the scope of coverage in all relevant claims settings.133
Change that may alter policy’s meaning by expanding
the scope of coverage in some relevant claims settings
and restricting it in others.
Change that may alter policy’s meaning by expanding
the scope of coverage in all relevant claims settings.
Change that only alters the amount of coverage provided
by changing numerical quantities, such as increasing
coverage for certain property from $500 to $1000.

130. I performed all of the defining of terms and coding of changes to these terms
myself. However, I occasionally had a trained research assistant do the first draft, which I
then carefully double-checked.
131. For new provisions, this inquiry required assessment of how the new term
impacted coverage relative to the absence of the term. In a small number of cases, a policy
revision completely removed a preexisting term. Where this happened, an additional
“shadow term” was added to the later policy to indicate the removal of that term.
132. In performing this coding, I adhered to three supplemental principles. First, global
changes to a policy (such as the hyphenation of a term) were treated as a single change, coded
in the first term in which they appear but not thereafter treated as an independent change.
Second, changes to cross references (either numerical or text reproduced verbatim from a
prior section) were not treated as a change apart from the term that triggered the need for
the changed cross reference. Third, for new coverages that clearly did not exist in prior policy
versions, restrictions on the scope of the new coverage were still treated as expansions
of coverage.
133. Evaluating the impact of any particular change on the generosity of coverage can
be complicated when a term interacts with other terms, as is common with definitions, for
instance. In these cases, the impact of a particular change is evaluated against the baseline of
the coverage that the updated policy would have provided had the term in question not
been altered.
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2. Phase Two: Linking innovation in the ISO HO3 policy to
published caselaw
Phase Two of the analysis focused on linking changes in the ISO
HO3 policy found in Phase One to any caselaw that may plausibly
have prompted those changes. To accomplish this, I relied on a
team of trained research assistants, acting under my supervision
and review, to implement the following protocol.
First, we isolated each individual policy term (as defined above)
that had been coded as a 2,134 3,135 or 4136 in Phase One, as only these
terms had been materially altered from the prior version of the
policy in a way that could plausibly have been influenced by
caselaw.137 For each of these material alterations, we then located
all published and unpublished cases available on Westlaw during
the relevant timeframe (as defined below) that quoted a portion of
the term as it was drafted prior to the revision. To ensure that we
captured the vast majority of such cases, we searched for cases that
contained, within a single sentence, five key words (excluding
articles) drawn from the policy term that had been revised.138
We are confident that this method generally captured the vast
majority of cases implicating policy language that was revised in
subsequent policies, as any such cases are virtually certain to quote
the relevant policy language before applying it to a particular
coverage dispute.
Because we were only interested in cases that may have been
causally connected to the changed terms, we restricted the search
to cases released within two years after the date of the updated

134. Change that may alter policy’s meaning and that restricts the scope of coverage in
all relevant claims settings.
135. Change that may alter policy’s meaning by expanding the scope of coverage in
some relevant claims settings and restricting it in others.
136. Change that may alter policy’s meaning by expanding the scope of coverage in all
relevant claims settings.
137. Although terms coded as 5—meaning that there was a change that only altered
the amount of coverage provided by changing numerical quantities—did indeed constitute
material changes, we reasoned that such changes could not have plausibly been related
to caselaw.
138. This approach did not work in the rare instances when entirely new provisions
were added to an updated policy; in these instances, we used a reduced number of key terms
from the new term to attempt to locate caselaw that might have triggered the addition.
Additionally, in a few instances, an individual term included more than one sentence.
In such cases we adjusted the search accordingly to span two sentences.
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policy and two years prior to the publication of the revised policy.
For instance, for a material change implemented in the 2010 HO3
policy, we searched for caselaw quoting the 1999 version of the
changed term, but only if this caselaw was made publicly available
between 1997 and 2012. We decided to start two years before the
publication of the unrevised policy to reflect the fact that cases
released shortly before publication of a finalized policy revision
may influence the subsequent policy revision. Meanwhile, we
extended the search two years past publication of the policy with
revised language to reflect the fact that some litigation may prompt
contractual change before it results in a publicly available opinion
if, for instance, preliminary court decisions foreshadowed the
ultimate result.
After locating these cases, we then made several adjustments to
avoid false positives and potential double counts. In particular, we
eliminated any cases where the opinion suggested that the parties
did not contest the meaning of the changed term.139 We reasoned
that such cases had no potential bearing on the subsequent change
in policy language.140 To avoid double counting individual cases,
we also eliminated any intermediate or trial court cases where a
higher court had released a decision that was also linked to the
changed term.141
Having eliminated the false positives and problematic double
counts, we then recorded a variety of the remaining cases’ features.
In addition to tracking the aggregate number of cases we found that
met the above criteria—with a self-imposed limit of ten cases per
term142—we recorded the type of court that issued the opinion and
139. We included cases that involved contestation of the exact same insurance language
in the context of a non-homeowners policy, so long as the language was not further specified
or defined in the policy at issue in the case in a way that differed from its treatment in the
homeowners policy.
140. For instance, in some cases, courts quoted policy language in the facts section of
the opinion, but this policy language had nothing to do with the legal issue that the court
addressed in the opinion.
141. However, we did record when individual cases were linked to multiple different
changes in terms using our protocol, and we also counted such cases towards the limit of ten
cases for each of those terms.
142. The number of terms that had more than ten cases linked to them varied. For the
terms that were materially changed, the number of terms that were capped at ten case links
were as follows: in 1975 there were 9 capped terms, in 1984 there were 14 capped terms, in
1990 there were 6 capped terms, in 1999 there were 40 capped terms, and in 2010 there were
12 capped terms. There were many fewer capped terms in the control data of terms that were
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whether the insurer, policyholder, or neither party prevailed with
respect to their preferred meaning of the policy language. We
imposed the cap of ten cases for practical reasons, as several terms
resulted in hundreds of cases that could not all be reviewed. In
instances where this cap was hit, we examined cases in the order of
how recently they were published within the relevant time frame.
As a control measure, we applied this same methodology to
policy terms that ISO left unchanged in each policy revision. This
allowed us to isolate the increased (or decreased) amount of
caselaw for changed terms relative to unchanged terms. To
implement this approach, we isolated from each policy revision
fifty random terms that had not been materially altered from the
prior policy iteration.143 We then repeated the process described
above for each of these terms; we searched for all cases released
between the revision dates of the two comparison policies (with the
two-year buffers added) that contained, within a single sentence,
five key words drawn from the term. We then eliminated all cases
in which the parties did not contest the meaning of the term.
3. Caveats and limitations of methodology
This methodology, of course, has important limitations. First,
the approach only yields evidence of correlation rather than
causation. It is possible that, in some cases, there is no causal link
between heightened amounts of caselaw regarding a term’s
meaning and ISO’s subsequent decision to materially alter that
term. For instance, it may be that the very reason that a term was
relatively heavily litigated was because it was flawed in ways that
would inevitably have prompted contractual change.144 But while
not materially changed. Here, the number of capped cases were as follows: in 1975 there
were no capped terms, in 1984 there were 4 capped terms, in 1990 there were 6 capped terms,
in 1999 there were 3 capped terms, and in 2010 there were 5 capped terms.
143. We also excluded from the control group terms that were part of global changes
to the policy but were coded as zeroes because they appeared after the first term in which
the global term appeared.
144. Another possible non-causal explanation for any correlation between cases and
policy revisions is that terms that are litigated are relatively likely to have significant
implications for coverage, a consideration which also impacts the likelihood of policy
revision. Although plausible, this explanation also seems unlikely to substantially explain
the results. The primary difficulty with this theory is that the importance of a policy term
does not, in itself, seem to have a substantial impact on the frequency of policy revisions.
It is in precisely the case of particularly important terms that the costs of redrafting—
including securing regulatory approval and increasing the risk of unintended
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it is impossible to reject this possibility for every materially changed
term, it is highly unlikely that this can systematically explain the
results. To the extent that a term was inherently problematic in a
way that would inevitably have prompted change, one would have
expected this change to have been made relatively early in the
evolution of the HO3 policy.
A second important limitation of the methodology is that it
does not seek to evaluate how often published caselaw fails to
prompt changes in policy language. As noted earlier, several
scholars have emphasized various instances when cases that
produce seemingly unfavorable results for insurers fail to prompt
relatively straightforward fixes.145 Thus, while the results can
demonstrate whether courts have played a significant role in the
evolution of insurance policy language, they cannot demonstrate
that this effect is inevitable or consistent with respect to individual
terms; to the contrary, the various instances of relatively limited
policy language change in the face of relevant and significant
amounts of caselaw suggest quite the opposite.146
A third limitation of the methodology is that it does not attempt
to evaluate the relative importance of different types of policy
changes. Thus, it groups together all changes that expand coverage
and all changes that restrict coverage, even though some of these
changes are obviously more consequential than others. For this
reason, comparing the number of coverage expansions to coverage
restrictions may not fully capture the ultimate impact of those
changes on the generosity of coverage.
Finally, an important caveat to this Article’s methodology is
that, as discussed earlier, some insurers are increasingly departing
in significant ways from the ISO HO3 policy.147 Consequently, the
results track the evolution of actual homeowners policies that are
consequences—may be greatest. Nor is it obvious that litigated cases disproportionately
involve broadly consequential terms. A policy term may be consequential enough in a single
case to warrant the costs of litigation, even though it comes up relatively infrequently.
Moreover, coverage disputes involving relatively important policy terms may be
disproportionally likely to settle before any case is published, as insurers may fear that a
negative precedent can have broad implications.
145. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14, 1117; French,
Insurance Policies, supra note 20, at 40.
146. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14, 1117; French,
Insurance Policies, supra note 20, at 40.
147. See Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7.
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employed across the country only among a (still quite large) subset
of insurers. As discussed in Part IV, this caveat has important
normative implications, as it suggests that lawmakers, courts, and
regulators should strongly consider promoting greater
standardization of insurance policies by requiring insurers
to use homeowners policies that are no less generous than the
ISO HO3 form.148
III. RESULTS: EVIDENCE OF COURTS’ SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN
PROMPTING INNOVATION OF HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE POLICIES
The dominant homeowners insurance policy in the United
States has evolved substantially over its fifty-year lifetime as the
ISO HO3 policy. These changes have undoubtedly made the policy
longer and more complex. But they have had a more mixed impact
on the scope of coverage provided to homeowners: sometimes
expanding coverage, sometimes restricting it, and often adopting
intermediate positions that potentially have both coverageexpanding and coverage-restricting features. Section A of this Part
reviews these results from Phase One of the study. Section B then
presents the results of Phase Two, providing evidence that judicial
caselaw has played a substantial role in guiding the evolution of
the modern homeowners policy. This role, moreover, seems to have
increased over time as the HO3 policy has matured. Notably,
caselaw appears to have played a much stronger role in prompting
changes that either restrict coverage or else that had mixed impacts
on the scope of coverage; by contrast, changes that unambiguously
expanded coverage were no more likely to have been linked to
caselaw than unchanged terms.
A. The Evolution of the ISO HO3 Policy over Time
The length and complexity of the ISO HO3 homeowners policy
has increased over time, but at a gradually decreasing rate. This is
well illustrated by Figure 1, which shows that the total number of
terms in each version of the policy continually increased until
1999 but leveled off in the 2010 revision. These trends are also
reflected in the total number of pages in each policy revision,

148. See infra Section IV.A.
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which increased from 8 pages (1971), to 12 pages (1975), to 15 pages
(1984), to 18 pages (1990), to 22 pages (1999), to 24 pages (2010).
600

Total Terms in Policy
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ISO HO3 Policy Revision Year
Total Terms

Material Changes

Nonmaterial Changes

Unchanged Terms

Figure 1: HO3 Term Changes over Time

The decreased rate of change in the homeowners policy is
evident not only by the aggregate number of terms in each policy
revision but also by the percentage of terms that were materially
altered in each revision. Material alterations encompass all changes
that received Codes 2, 3, 4, or 5 in each revision. Figure 2 charts the
percentage of such terms, as compared to the percentage of terms
that were either immaterially altered (received a Code 1) or left
unchanged (Code 0) in each revision. As it illustrates, the
percentage of terms that were materially altered has generally
decreased over time, albeit with a blip in the data for the 1999
revision. But even the 1999 revision had a smaller percentage of
material changes to its terms than the 1975 or 1984 revisions.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Policy Terms Materially Altered

Focusing just on non-quantitative material alterations to policy
language—a category that encompasses changes coded as 2, 3, or 4,
and which is referred to below as “modified terms”—these changes
were slightly more likely to restrict coverage than to expand
coverage.149 As Figure 3 illustrates, the percentage of modified
terms that unambiguously restricted coverage ranged from 32% to
63% of total modified terms for each policy revision year. But in
each revision, a meaningful percentage of modified terms—
between 17% and 35%—unambiguously increased the scope of
coverage, and a substantial percentage—between 43% and 20%—
had a mixed or unclear impact on the scope of coverage.

149. Changes that only altered the amount of coverage provided by changing
numerical quantities, and thus received a code of 5, consistently expanded coverage,
typically by increasing coverage limits for discrete items.
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Figure 3: Impact of Modified Terms on Scope of Coverage

Although modified terms were only moderately more likely to
restrict coverage than to expand it, the percentage of changes that
restricted coverage relative to other types of material textual
changes has increased over time. Indeed, as illustrated by Figure 4,
the ratio of coverage-expanding changes to coverage-restricting
changes has decreased in every revision. Another illustration of this
point is that the total number of modified terms that
unambiguously restricted coverage (Code 2) oscillated between 30
and 100, while the number of changes that unambiguously
expanded coverage (Code 4) declined from around 50 in the 1975
revision to 7 in the 2010 revision.
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Figure 4: Ratio of Coverage-Expanding Modifications to
Coverage-Restricting Modifications

B. The Role of Caselaw in Prompting Changes to the Homeowners Policy
The ISO HO3 policy has clearly changed significantly over time.
This Section assesses the role of courts in this evolution. To do so,
it attempts to link modified terms containing material, textual
alterations—coded as 2s, 3s, or 4s in Phase One—to published
caselaw. The total number of such modified terms for each policy
revision is reported in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Total Number of Modified Terms

The data suggest that judicial caselaw has played a major role
in prompting material textual changes to the ISO homeowners
policy. The best way to see this is in Figure 6, which reports both
the average number of cases linked to modified terms and the
average number of cases linked to unchanged policy terms (i.e.,
terms that were coded 0). Recall that a case was linked to a term if
(i) it quoted portions of the term’s policy language, (ii) in the time
period between when the term was changed and the last policy
revision, and (iii) individualized analysis concluded that the parties
contested the meaning of the quoted policy language.150 As Figure
6 shows, the average number of cases linked to modified terms
varied from roughly 1.8 to 4.5 depending on the policy year. By
contrast, the average number of cases linked to unchanged terms
ranged from .93 to 1.88 depending on the year. Collapsing all five
revisions of the HO3 policy, terms with materially altered text were
linked with approximately twice as many cases relative to
150. See supra Section II.B.
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unchanged terms.151 These differences between the number of case
links for modified and unchanged terms are statistically significant.
5
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Unchanged Terms

Figure 6: Average Number of Cases Linked to Modified Terms Relative to
Unchanged Terms

Indeed, for each revision year other than 1975, the difference
between the average number of case links for modified and
unchanged terms is statistically significant at a 98% confidence
level.152 When considered across all five policy revisions, the
statistical significance of the gap between these two categories is
well over 99%.153

151. Because we capped at ten the number of case links for each textual change, these
figures cannot be explained by a very large number of cases associated with a small number
of alterations.
152. These calculations were performed using a simple T test for samples with
unequal variances.
153. Moreover, the results understate the average number of case links for changed
terms as a result of the self-imposed cap of ten case links per term. See supra note 142.
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The importance of caselaw in prompting contractual innovation
is reinforced by Figure 7, which reports the total percentage of
modified and unchanged terms that were linked to at least one case.
80%
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Figure 7: Percentage of Modified Terms and Unchanged Terms Linked to at
Least One Case

As Figure 7 reports, in every revision year, modified terms were
more likely than unchanged terms to be linked to at least one case.

Although the number of terms that had more than ten cases linked to them varied, this cap
disproportionately impacted changed terms relative to the unchanged control terms. For the
terms that were materially changed, the number of terms that were capped at ten case links
were as follows: in 1975 there were 9 capped terms out of approximately 160 materially
altered terms; in 1984 there were 14 capped terms out of approximately 160 materially altered
terms; in 1990 there were 6 capped terms out of approximately 90 materially altered terms;
in 1999 there were 40 capped terms out of approximately 180 materially altered terms; and
in 2010 there were 12 capped terms out of approximately 80 materially altered terms. In total,
then, approximately 12% of changed terms were capped. For terms that were not materially
changed, the number of capped cases (out of 50 total control terms for each revision) were as
follows: in 1975 there were no capped terms, in 1984 there were 4 capped terms, in 1990 there
were 6 capped terms, in 1999 there were 3 capped terms, and in 2010 there were 5 capped
terms. Thus, only approximately 7% of unchanged terms were capped at ten.
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Overall, 58% of modified terms were linked to at least one case,
whereas 43% of unchanged terms were linked to at least one case.
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Figure 8: Difference in Average Number of Cases Linked to Modified and
Unchanged Terms

The data also suggest a second trend: caselaw seems to have
played an increasingly important role in prompting material
textual changes to the ISO homeowners policy. As illustrated in
Figure 8, the average number of cases linked to a modified term
relative to the average number of such case links for unchanged
terms has steadily increased with each HO3 update, with the slight
exception of the 1990 revision.
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Figure 9: Difference in Percentage of Modified Terms and Unchanged Terms Linked
to at Least One Case

Similarly, Figure 9 shows that—with the notable exception of 1999,
when a high percentage of unchanged terms were linked to at least
one case—the difference between the percentage of modified terms
and unchanged terms linked to caselaw has increased in each
revision year. Of course, these trends are much more speculative
than those above, given that the number of data points for changes
over time is limited to the five times that the ISO HO3 policy has
been revised.
Interestingly, caselaw seems to have played a much more
prominent role in prompting modified terms that restrict or have a
mixed impact on coverage than in prompting changes that expand
coverage. This conclusion is reflected in Figure 10, which breaks
down the average number of cases linked to three different types
of modified terms: (i) those that unambiguously restrict coverage
(Code 2), (ii) those that have ambiguous or mixed implications with
respect to the scope of coverage (Code 3), and (iii) those that
unambiguously expand coverage (Code 4). The Figure also reports
the average number of cases linked to terms that were left
unchanged (Code 0). As the data in Figure 10 suggest, modified
terms that restricted coverage generally had the greatest number of
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case links, followed closely by modified terms that had an
ambiguous impact on the scope of coverage. By contrast, changes
that expanded coverage in the ISO HO3 policy were linked on
average to a much lower number of cases, which was only slightly
larger than the average number of case links for the control group
of terms that were unchanged.
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Figure 10: Average Number of Case Links per Modified Terms
and Unchanged Terms

The comparatively weak link between caselaw and coverageexpanding modifications is also illustrated by Figure 11. This
Figure shows that a majority (51%) of the coverage-expanding
modifications were not linked with any cases, as was also true for
the unchanged policy terms (57%). By contrast, only about 40% of
coverage-restricting (Code 2) and ambiguous (Code 3)
modifications were not linked to any cases. Similarly, a much
smaller percentage of coverage-expanding modifications were
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linked to ten or more cases (3%) than was true for ambiguous (13%)
or coverage-restricting (20%) modifications.154
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Figure 11: Number of Case Law Links for Modified Terms and Unchanged Terms

Not surprisingly, much of the caselaw that was linked to both
material textual modifications and unchanged terms came from
state appellate courts.155 As illustrated in Figure 12, 53% of the cases
linked to modified terms came from state intermediate appellate
courts, 24% of these cases came from state supreme courts, and 21%
came from federal courts. These breakdowns are very similar to the
breakdown of cases that were linked to unchanged terms—52% of
which came from state intermediate courts, 15% of which came
154. In fact, a smaller percentage of coverage-expanding textual revisions were linked
to ten or more cases than the percentage of control terms that is this cap (7%).
155. The relative composition of different types of court decisions does not appear to
depend on whether the modification is coverage expanding, coverage restricting,
or ambiguous.
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from state supreme courts, and 24% of which came from federal
courts. These data suggest that the type of court issuing a relevant
opinion does not, in and of itself, substantially influence the
likelihood that a judicial opinion will prompt contractual change.
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

Fed. Ct. (%)
St. SC (%)
St. App. (%)
St. DC (%)
Fed. Ct. (%)
St. SC (%)
St. App. (%)
St. DC (%)
Fed. Ct. (%)
St. SC (%)
St. App. (%)
St. DC (%)
Fed. Ct. (%)
St. SC (%)
St. App. (%)
St. DC (%)
Fed. Ct. (%)
St. SC (%)
St. App. (%)
St. DC (%)
Fed. Ct. (%)
St. SC (%)
St. App. (%)
St. DC (%)

0%

1975

1984

1990

1999

2010

ISO HO3 Policy Revision Year
Modified Terms

Unchanged Terms

Figure 12: Types of Cases Linked to Terms, by Court
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Another notable finding is that policyholders need not
consistently prevail in coverage disputes for those disputes to be
linked to changed policy language. To the contrary, as reported in
Figure 13, insurers prevailed in almost half of all the cases linked to
modified terms, a win percentage that was only slightly lower than
the baseline win percentage in cases that were linked to unchanged
policy terms.
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Figure 13: Prevailing Parties in Cases Linked to Terms

The relevance of the mere fact that a term produces litigation,
as opposed to who ultimately wins the case, is also suggested by
Figure 14. That Figure shows that the type of changes that insurers
make to their policy forms are not generally impacted by whether
insurers or policyholders prevail in the underlying lawsuits.
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Figure 14: Overall Case Link Breakdown by Outcome

Although policyholders need not consistently prevail to
prompt material textual changes in policy language, it does appear
that it makes a difference with respect to the likelihood of redrafting
if policyholders consistently lose coverage disputes. This point is
reflected in Figure 15, which reports that approximately 44% of
policy modifications were linked to caselaw that included at least
one clear policyholder victory. By contrast, only 21% of the
unchanged policy terms were linked to caselaw that included a
clear policyholder victory.
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Figure 15: Modified and Unchanged Terms Linked to at Least One Case Where
Policyholder Prevailed

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INSURANCE AND CONTRACT LAW
Part III suggests that courts have played a major role in shaping
the modern homeowners insurance policy. This Part considers the
implications of this fact, both for insurance law specifically and for
contract law more generally. With respect to the former, it argues
that judicially prompted innovation of the ISO HO3 form has
promoted more efficient and fair insurance markets, at least for the
majority of insurers that continue to rely on policies that closely
track the ISO form. For this reason, courts should continue to
embrace penalty default rules, like contra proferentem, that
maximize insurers’ incentives to redraft unclear or ambiguous
policy language. Section A of this Part also reviews prior research
demonstrating that penalty default rules in insurance law have
worked less well when it comes to homeowners forms that
515
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substantially depart from the ISO model. The Section argues that,
taken together, these findings suggest that states should consider
requiring homeowners insurers to use policies that are at least as
generous as the ISO HO3 policy.
Section B broadens the analysis to consider the implications of
the Article’s findings for the empirical literature on contract
innovation. Against the backdrop of this literature, the Article’s
results suggest that different types of contracts can evolve quite
differently: whereas sophisticated financial contracts like sovereign
bond covenants may be sticky and change through herding,
consumer-oriented form contracts may be more likely to evolve
steadily in response to judicial pressures. But even within broad
categories like consumer and business-oriented contracts, market
and institutional structures have a significant impact on the pace
and nature of contractual innovation generally and judicially
prompted innovation in particular.
A. Insurance Law
1. Insurance law’s penalty default rules and the ISO HO3 policy
Insurance policies are often described as contracts of adhesion
that are drafted by insurers and offered to consumers on a take-itor-leave-it basis.156 But as Part III demonstrates, courts have played
a major role in the evolution of the ISO HO3 policy due to their
embrace of penalty default rules like contra proferentem.157 This role
has ultimately served the collective interests of both insurers and
consumers, for two essential reasons.
First, the data clearly demonstrate that, over its fifty-year
evolution, the ISO HO3 policy has become longer, more precise,
and more fully specified as a result of judicial scrutiny.158 Not
surprisingly, ambiguous, non-specific, and confusing policy
language can frequently prompt coverage disputes: insurers have
natural incentives to interpret unclear language so as to limit
coverage, whereas policyholders have precisely the opposite

156. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Randall, supra note 62, at 125; Fischer,
supra note 62, at 996.
157. See supra Section III.B.
158. See supra Section III.A.
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incentives.159 Such coverage disputes are costly for all involved:
aside from the obvious legal costs that these clashes produce, they
also leave insureds who have recently suffered a loss in a state of
prolonged uncertainty and stress.160 Additionally, the legal costs
that insurers incur in these disputes are likely passed on to their
policyholders at least partially in the form of increased premiums.
Precise and specific homeowners policies help to limit the
likelihood of these costly and taxing coverage disputes. Perhaps
most obviously, clear and specific policy language allows insurance
adjustors and claims supervisors to more reliably and quickly
determine their insurer’s coverage obligations.161 Just as
importantly, however, such clarity empowers consumers—often
with the help of family, friends, or advisors—to decipher their
coverage rights relatively clearly after a loss has occurred.162 This is
because state law generally requires insurers that deny a claim or
issue a reservation of rights letter to promptly provide a written
explanation for their decision that quotes the relevant policy
language.163 Whereas policyholders rarely read policy language
closely when they first purchase coverage,164 they can and often do

159. See JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T
PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010).
160. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the
British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735 (2009).
161. Insurers rarely deny coverage when clear and precise policy language requires the
provision of such coverage, as doing so exposes them to the threat of punitive damages for
a bad faith denial of a claim. See Mark J. Browne, Ellen S. Pryor & Bob Puelz, The Effect of
Bad‐Faith Laws on First‐Party Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2004);
Danial P. Asmat & Sharon Tennyson, Does the Threat of Insurer Liability for “Bad Faith” Affect
Insurance Settlements?, 81 J. RISK & INS. 1 (2014).
162. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1494–98; Boardman, Tested
Language Defense, supra note 62.
163. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1496; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-66-206(13) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104 (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 (2019).
164. To be sure, the increasing length and complexity of the ISO HO3 policy has made
it even more difficult for consumers to fully read and understand that policy at the time of
purchase. But consumers do not read and/or understand even relatively short standard form
contracts. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone
Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4
(2014). The increasing length and complexity of the HO3 policy is thus unlikely to change
this result for the vast majority of consumers. For those consumers who do wish to have a
better sense of what their policy covers at the time of purchase, the solution is not a
misguided attempt for a more “readable” and “simplified” insurance policy, but the design
of a standardized summary disclosure form that contains the key details consumers care
about. See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in
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read this language closely when trying to understand whether they
have been rightly denied insurance proceeds.165
To be sure, precision and specificity in homeowners policies
would do little to advance consumer interests if they only operated
to restrict coverage. But the second reason that judicial scrutiny has
improved insurance markets is that it has prompted revisions to the
ISO HO3 policy that reasonably balance consumers’ desire for
protection against insurers’ legitimate need to minimize dangers
like moral hazard and adverse selection.166 Rather than inexorably
narrowing coverage, the data show that judicially promoted
revisions to the ISO HO3 policy have resulted in terms that have a
mixed impact on coverage almost as often as they have produced
terms that unambiguously restrict coverage.167 The data also show
that unambiguous expansions of coverage are relatively common,
though these changes appear not to be driven by caselaw.168
The lack of a clear link between unambiguous coverage
expansions and court cases is consistent with the conclusion that
judicial scrutiny of the ISO HO3 policy has prompted reasonable
and even-handed coverage revisions. This is because coverage
expansions in response to judicial decisions typically manifest
themselves not as changes in policy language, but instead as the
retention of policy language, notwithstanding caselaw finding that
language is ambiguous. Insurance law’s penalty default rules are
specifically designed to expand coverage when the policy itself is
ambiguous or contains gaps.169 Meanwhile, as noted above,
affirmatively redrafting ISO policy terms to produce this result is
both costly and risky.170 For these reasons, it is easier for insurers to
Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 420–25 (2014) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Transparently Opaque].
165. See generally Hoffman, supra note 58, at 1412 (“Most argue, in one form or another,
that even if terms don’t affect behavior ex ante, they certainly can ex post.”).
166. See supra Section III.A.
167. See id.
168. See supra Section III.B. This is especially true early in the ISO HO3 policy’s
evolution. Later in the policy’s evolution, coverage restrictions start to outpace coverage
expansions. But this is consistent with the fact that, as the contract has matured, an
increasingly large percentage of revisions are prompted by court cases. This trend, in turn,
can best be explained by the fact that decades of revisions have left little need for contract
revisions in the absence of changed circumstances, like relevant court cases.
169. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 58–59. See generally Ayres & Gertner,
supra note 29, at 90.
170. See supra Section II.A.2.
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expand coverage in response to judicial scrutiny simply by
retaining language that courts have repeatedly found
ambiguous,171 rather than by explicitly altering the ISO form.172
The tendency of changes to the ISO HO3 policy to both increase
precision and reasonably balance consumer and insurer interests is
not surprising. There are good reasons to believe that detailed and
precise terms in the ISO HO3 policy facilitate the ability of
consumer proxies, like state regulators and market
intermediaries—such as agents, brokers, journalists, consumer
activists, and academics—to understand exactly what is and is not
covered by the homeowners policy and to advance consumer
interests accordingly. For instance, a clear term limiting coverage
for mold-related claims may prompt a regulator to withhold
approval of the policy form unless coverage is extended for specific
mold losses that are unlikely to involve moral hazard.173
Alternatively, such an exclusion may prompt insurance agents to
object that this type of change will make it harder to sell coverage.
These possibilities, of course, impact how ISO drafts coverage
restrictions in the first place.
By contrast, it is much harder for regulators or market
intermediaries to advocate for more coverage-expansive terms in
policies containing extensive gaps or ambiguities. Not only is there
the problem of “spotting” the existence of an important gap or
ambiguity in the first place, but it’s also hard to anticipate the
various ways in which such gaps and ambiguities may become
relevant in different claims settings.174 And even in the rare cases
when regulators and intermediaries identify potential ambiguities
or gaps, they often cannot predict how insurers will respond when
a claim is actually made.175 By forcing these issues to be addressed
171. See Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 20, at 1113–14, 1117; French,
Insurance Policies, supra note 20, at 40; ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 615 (noting
that courts have “created a body of common law rules” governing the duty to defend, and
“[a]pparently insurers can live with the results, as they have not revised their policies
to alter” them).
172. Of course, such redrafting would be optimal because it would enhance the form’s
precision and specificity, as described above.
173. See Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1492–94. State insurance
regulators in most states can refuse to approve homeowners policy forms. See id.
174. See generally Schwarcz, Coverage Information, supra note 30, at 1474.
175. For example, in attempting to justify the inclusion of an “absolute pollution
exclusion” in commercial general liability policies, the industry claimed that “the language
of the exclusion was drafted with unrealistic breadth to ensure its effectiveness,” but “it
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clearly within the four corners of the industry standard policy,
judicially prompted innovation thus effectively “activates” the
ability of market intermediaries and regulators to represent
consumer interests. It is for precisely this reason that judicially
prompted changes to the ISO HO3 policy often result in revisions
that have a mixed impact on the scope of coverage.176
In sum, insurance law’s embrace of penalty default rules
generally, and contra proferentem in particular, appears to have
played a major role in causing the ISO homeowners insurance
policy to become clearer and more precise.177 This contractual
innovation, in turn, has facilitated compromise regarding the scope
of coverage provided by that policy while empowering consumers
and their advisers to accurately and quickly understand their
coverage rights after a loss has occurred. For these reasons,
insurance law should continue to embrace strong penalty
default rules.178
2. Penalty default rules and non-ISO homeowners policies
Although the evolution of the ISO HO3 policy has largely
served consumer and insurer interests alike, the same cannot be
said for the recent emergence of proprietary homeowners policies
that depart significantly from ISO forms.179 To be sure, like the ISO
HO3 policy, these proprietary forms often have the benefits of
precision and completeness described above.180 But as I have
would not be literally enforced against insured[s] in cases where doing so would be
inconsistent with basic understanding about the policy.” Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet
Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading
Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 235–36 (1998).
176. See supra Section III.B.
177. Although policyholders need not consistently prevail for caselaw to prompt
changed policy language, they must have a significant chance of winning for this result to
obtain. See supra Section III.B. Indeed, policy revisions were much more likely than control
terms to be linked to at least one clear policyholder victory. See id. Additionally, cases with
plausible arguments are much more likely to prompt published caselaw, as opposed to
summary dismissals in unpublished opinions. See, e.g., Bert I. Huang & Tejas N. Narechania,
Judicial Priorities, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1719 (2015).
178. But see Rappaport, supra note 98, at 207–08 (arguing that contra proferentem does
not ultimately promote effective and efficient insurance markets).
179. See generally Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7 (exploring in depth the
prevalence and characteristics of homeowners policies that depart significantly from the
ISO HO3 policy).
180. See id.
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explored at length in prior work, these policies typically do not
embrace compromise positions when it comes to changes in
coverage; to the contrary, they often systematically restrict
coverage relative to the ISO HO3 form.181
The reason for this different result is that, unlike changes to the
ISO policy, innovation in proprietary forms is not well policed by
regulators and market actors. Because of ISO’s historically
dominant role in drafting homeowners insurance policies, an
immense amount of attention is devoted to revisions of these forms.
For instance, numerous trade publications for brokers, agents,
lawyers, and underwriters publish articles about revisions to major
ISO programs, like the homeowners program.182 Copies of these
updated ISO forms are published in materials that are used to train
aspiring insurance lawyers, agents, and underwriters.183 Perhaps
even more importantly, state regulators often spend a great deal of
time reviewing proposed revisions to the ISO HO3 policy.184 This is
because ISO itself, in order to facilitate insurer use of these
documents, secures regulatory approval of its policy forms in every
state in the country that requires such approval.185 Knowing that
these filings have disproportionate influence on consumers, state
regulators often review these filings carefully and demand various
concessions, which are reflected in state-specific endorsements.186
This regulatory review process is presumably aided by state
insurance regulators’ relative familiarity with prior versions of ISO
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 112; Patrick Wraight, How Does the Homeowners’ Policy
Deal with Trees?, INS. J.: ACAD. J. (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/
academy-journal/2017/10/11/466847.htm; Patrick Wraight, 4 Reasons Your Insured
Wants Ordinance or Law Coverage, INS. J.: ACAD. J. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://
www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2018/01/03/475878.htm.
183. See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 6, at 197–223; TOM BAKER & KYLE D.
LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2017); INS. INFO. INST., supra note 127;
MCCORMICK & CLAPP, JR., supra note 80.
184. See New ISO Residential Property Policy Forms Approved, TEX. DEP’T INS.
(Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.tdi.texas.gov/orders/co020741.html; VERISK, Homeowners
2000, supra note 89.
185. See, e.g., ISO Files Insurance Policy Forms and Rules Insurers Can Use for
Terror Coverage Under New Federal Backstop Law, VERISK (Dec. 4, 2002),
https://www.verisk.com/archived/2002/iso-files-insurance-policy-forms-and-rulesinsurers-can-use-for-terror-coverage-under-new-federal-ba/.
186. See, e.g., New ISO Residential Property Policy Forms Approved, supra note 184
(describing rigorous regulatory review of ISO HO3 policy form submissions, including
numerous concessions made by ISO to secure regulatory approval for use of form in Texas).
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homeowners forms, which allows them to quickly grasp a
revision’s structure and the potential implications of its
proposed changes.
By contrast, regulators and market intermediaries are poorly
situated to police innovation in proprietary forms that significantly
depart from ISO forms. Whereas ISO forms operate as a single point
of focus because of their historical dominance in homeowners
insurance markets, individual insurers are often able to escape
rigorous regulatory and market scrutiny of their policy forms.187
This is because many, if not most, state insurance regulators simply
do not have the resources to carefully review and understand
the implications of numerous different individual carriers’
company-specific forms.188 It is one thing to carefully review a
handful of changes to the long-dominant industry form with which
regulators have worked for decades; it is quite another to review
changes to numerous different companies’ individual forms, which
have their own unique structure and internal logic.
The different levels of scrutiny that ISO policy revisions and
revisions to individual insurers’ proprietary policies receive are
even more stark when it comes to market intermediaries.
Individual insurers’ changes to their proprietary forms are largely
invisible to most market actors: these changes are not typically
covered by industry periodicals or taught in classes for industry
professionals.189 In fact, it is incredibly difficult even to secure
copies of individual insurers’ proprietary forms, which carriers do
not generally make available online or allow to be reprinted in
industry sources.190 Additionally, very few people—including
many insurance agents—know how each of these proprietary
187. See generally Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7, at 1318–37 (outlining the
difficulty in obtaining company-specific forms).
188. See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., IMPROVING U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION 18–19 (2017).
189. See generally Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7, at 1328–37 (discussing the lack
of available information regarding the content of individual insurers’ proprietary policies).
190. See Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque, supra note 164, at 425–26. See generally
RUTGERS CTR. FOR RISK & RESP., ESSENTIAL PROTECTIONS FOR POLICYHOLDERS 10–17 (2019),
https://epp.law.rutgers.edu/sites/epp/files/EPP-full-2019_0.pdf (recommending taking
action to protect consumers and provide online resources); RUTGERS CTR. FOR RISK & RESP.,
ESSENTIAL PROTECTION FOR POLICYHOLDERS STATE RANKINGS OF HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE
PROTECTIONS: BUYING INSURANCE (2017), https://epp.law.rutgers.edu/sites/epp/files/
EPP%20Buying%20insurance.pdf (finding that “[o]nly five states make homeowners
insurance policy forms available online” and “[a]bout a dozen states provide some tool that
consumers can use to compare policy terms”).
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policy forms differ from the ISO HO3 policy.191 For these reasons,
market and regulatory forces do much less to effectively constrain
change to these company-specific forms than to the ISO
HO3 policy.
Insurers’ increasing use of proprietary forms that depart
significantly from the ISO standard creates numerous market
problems even apart from their tendency to systematically reduce
coverage in ways that consumers do not understand. Most
importantly, varying policy forms undermine the extent to which
consumers can make trade-offs on issues about which they are
relatively informed, like price and customer service.192 This is
because they prevent consumers from making apples-to-apples
comparisons among competing carriers.193 Meanwhile, such
variety does not plausibly promote meaningful consumer tradeoffs
between coverage and price nor enhance efficient contractual
innovation precisely because so few policyholders have even a
rudimentary understanding of whether their insurance policy
departs from ISO language and, if so, the implications of these
departures. Varying policy forms also undermine the capacity of
consumers, regulators, and market intermediaries to develop and
communicate clear understandings of what is and is not covered by
homeowners insurance; although innumerable sources provide
generalized answers to this question, most specific coverage
questions can only be answered by explaining that “it depends on
your policy language.”194
States should respond to these vast differences in the evolution
of ISO consumer-oriented insurance policies and company-specific
proprietary policies by considering the very same solution that they
adopted over a century ago—when they required fire insurers to
offer coverage that was no less generous than that contained within
a standard policy.195 These rules have become largely obsolete as a
191. Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7, at 1328–37.
192. See Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque, supra note 164, at 420–27.
193. See Abraham L. Wickelgren, Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of Form
Contracts, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 30 (2011).
194. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO HOME
INSURANCE 1 (2010).
195. See Lecomte, supra note 64, at 228–29. In fact, many states continue to require that
fire insurance included within homeowners insurance policies be no less generous than
statutorily-prescribed forms. See, e.g., Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d
683, 692 (Minn. 1997). Interestingly, many states also required life insurers to issue a standard
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result of the evolution of the bundled homeowners policy, which
provides protection from numerous perils in addition to fire, as
well as liability protection.196 By elevating ISO homeowners
insurance policies from presumptive and historical default into a
legally-required minimum floor of coverage, states could
reinvigorate this historical solution to the problem of varying
policy forms that hollow out coverage.197 And they could do so by
piggy-backing on the various benefits of judicially prompted
innovation of the ISO HO3 form.198
To be sure, there are plausible objections to completely
standardizing homeowners insurance policies. For instance, doing
so would indeed limit choice for the small segment of consumers
who trade off coverage terms and price when shopping for
coverage. This concern is partly addressed by allowing insurers to
provide more expansive coverage than the ISO HO3 policy, but this
would not address the preferences of consumers who would
choose less expansive coverage for lower premiums. Another
potential concern is that converting the ISO HO3 policy form into a
state-required minimum could complicate ISO’s revision process
while empowering a private company to set legal standards. Here
too, however, there is at least a partial solution: state law could
require insurers to offer coverage at least as generous as a specific
version of the ISO HO3 policy rather than dynamically
incorporating by reference updated versions of the policy that were
produced after the law’s passage.199 Doing so would ensure that
state legislatures, rather than just the ISO, would have to
affirmatively approve changes to the HO3 policy before those
changes became part of the state-required floor for coverage.

life insurance policy in the earlier twentieth century for similar reasons. See Coyle, supra note
35, at 1163.
196. See supra Section II.A.
197. See Schwarcz, Reevaluating, supra note 7, at 1340–43.
198. See id. at 1341 (noting that a major consideration in whether states should adopt
mandatory floors for coverage is whether states could work with ISO to design a workable
floor based on an ISO model).
199. See Daniel Schwarcz, Is U.S. Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional?, 25 CONN. INS.
L.J. 191, 197 (2018) (discussing problems associated with state insurance law’s dynamic
incorporation by reference of NAIC standards).
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B. The Varied and Context-Specific Role of Courts in the Evolution of
Form Contracts
Aside from its implications for insurance law, this Article’s
results also help to advance the burgeoning empirical literature on
contractual innovation.200 First, the results suggest that while
standard form contracts may be resistant to change in many
domains, this result is hardly inevitable. Although the evolution of
the homeowners insurance policy has surely been gradual—
spanning well over fifty years—it has also been relatively
responsive to court cases.201 Moreover, the various instances when
homeowners insurance policies have not changed in response to
relevant court cases are best understood as an affirmative decision
by insurers to expand coverage, rather than as evidence of
irrational contractual stickiness.202
Perhaps not surprisingly, this pattern of innovation in
homeowners insurance policies is more consistent with evidence
regarding the evolution of consumer contracts than sophisticated
commercial contracts. As discussed in Part I, sophisticated financial
instruments like sovereign bond contracts often exhibit patterns of
prolonged stickiness paired with sudden change prompted by
mass herding to new terms.203 By contrast, innovation in the most
closely studied, consumer-oriented form contracts—EULAs—
appears to be relatively robust. This is especially true when firms
can observe the impact of policy language through judicial
decisions or changes in consumer behavior.204 Because virtually all
terms in homeowners policies fit this description, the patterns of
innovation exhibited by the ISO HO3 policy are consistent with
these findings.
The emerging evidence thus suggests that, other things being
equal, consumer contracts are more likely than sophisticated
commercial contracts to exhibit gradual but persistent innovation,
particularly with respect to relevant caselaw. This possibility can be
explained in a variety of ways from a theoretical perspective. For
instance, drafters of consumer-oriented contracts may be relatively
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section I.A.
See Dari-Mattiacci & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 4, at 4–5.

525

3.SCHWARCZ_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

3/11/2021 12:58 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:2 (2021)

less worried about the potential signaling effect of revising contract
terms, as most consumers are unlikely to be responsive to these
types of signals given that they do not read contracts in the first
place. Alternatively, drafters of consumer contracts may not
internalize the benefits of contract standardization across time,
which principally benefits consumers. Yet another possibility is
that free-riding on contract innovation is easier to overcome in the
context of consumer-oriented contracts, as consumer-facing firms
tend not to compete with one another based on contract terms.
The divergent evolution of the ISO HO3 policy and individual
insurers’ proprietary policies also helps to shed light on the
direction and impact of innovation in consumer-oriented contracts.
As with innovation of EULA contracts, revisions to homeowners
policies have tended to result in longer and more complex
contracts.205 But while changes to both EULA terms and proprietary
homeowners policies tended to be pro-seller, the impact of
innovation in the ISO HO3 policy was more balanced between
consumer and seller interests. Consistent with the substantial
theoretical literature on the efficiency of standard form contracts,206
these trends tend to suggest that innovation of consumer forms is
more likely to be balanced to the extent that this innovation can be
easily policed by informed and unbiased consumers, market
intermediaries, and government actors. As suggested earlier, such
policing is much more difficult when it comes to heterogeneous
consumer contracts that are crafted by individual firms than when
it comes to a single, dominant form contract that is the presumptive
industry default, like the ISO HO3 policy.207
CONCLUSION
Homeowners insurance policies are among the most important
standard form consumer contracts in the United States. The
historical dominance of one particular version of this contract—the
ISO HO3 policy—offers a unique opportunity to understand how
205. See supra Section I.B, Part III.
206. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983);
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217–18 (2003); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1373, 1376–77 (2004).
207. See supra Section IV.A.
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this contract has evolved over time. Meanwhile, the relatively
recent tendency of several large, national insurers to depart from
this standard form offers unique insights into how consumer
contracts evolve under different market and institutional
conditions. Exploiting these elements of the homeowners insurance
market, this Article demonstrates that the ISO HO3 policy has
evolved consistently over time in response to caselaw, in ways that
largely promote the joint interests of insurers and consumers. By
contrast, insurers that have jettisoned the ISO form in favor of
divergent proprietary policies have tended to revise their policies
to systematically restrict coverage. These divergent paths offer
important lessons both for insurance law and for the burgeoning
empirical literature on contract innovation.
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